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   Entering the information age, the presence of advertisements has been ever increasing in people’s 
daily life. With portable electronic devices become overly accessible, it’s possibly safe to say that it’s 
hard to live a day without seeing any advertisements. 
 Fully utilizing the mere-exposure effect, a robust phenomenon extensively studied in Psychology 
literature, advertising aims to improve the preference of targeted consumers for certain brand or 
product through repeated exposures. It is found that higher advertising spending is related to better 
sales and profitability, higher brand equity, and larger market capitalization. There is also evidence 
supporting that advertising has a positive effect on stock returns. However, the studies are yet scarce 
regarding the effectiveness of advertising in the IPO setting. 
 
 
 Here, this study analyzes the effect of advertising on IPO performance using U.S. and Chinese data 
from 2008 to 2017. Both short-term and long-term stock performance around IPO are analyzed, and 
it is also examined that if there’s any regional difference. 
 First, short-term IPO performance as measured by IPO underpricing is examined with advertising 
intensity as the dependent variable. Firm size, underwriter reputation, and industry factors are 
controlled in the regression analyses. The results show that advertising expense has no effect on IPO 
underpricing in the U.S., while it has a significantly negative effect in China. As IPO underpricing is 
considered as the issuing firm leaving money on the table, lower underpricing suggests that advertising 
improves short-term IPO performance in China. 
 Second, long-term IPO performance is calculated as 1-year BHARs and examined for any effect of 
advertising expense in the same way. Again, no effect is found in the U.S., while advertising intensity 
is positively related with 1-year BHARs with marginal significance (p-value < 0.1). For the purpose 
of robustness check, calendar-time portfolios are formed and provide additional evidence supporting 
the results in China. 
 Last but not the least, regional differences are observed from the obviously different results between 
U.S. and China. Advertising seems to have a stronger effect on IPO performance both short-term and 
long-term in China than in the U.S. The findings may be related to the fact that stock markets in the 
two countries have quite different constitutions of investors and regulations over the IPO process. 
 
 
 Overall, the current study attempts to explain the results using the mere-exposure effect, where heavy 
spending in advertising gives the firm an advantage at the time of IPO due to improved consumer 
preference. The theory can also be related the market-based asset theory, which suggests that 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Do advertising expenses pay off? While many researches have studied the effect of advertising 
on accounting figures, this study examines it in the rather less explored initial public offering (IPO) 
setting. Using 372 IPO data from two Chinese (Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange) and three U.S. markets (NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX) from 2008 to 2017, the effects of 
advertising expenses on the short-term and long-term IPO performance in the post-GFC period are 
examined.  
Existing literatures were limited and mainly focused on U.S. data in the pre-GFC period, and 
it was established that advertising expenses help reduce IPO underpricing, but mixed results were 
provided on long-term post-IPO returns. Using regression analyses, this study fails to provide further 
evidence supporting the main effects of advertising expenses on any of the two topics at focus in the 
U.S. markets. However, in the Chinese markets, higher advertising intensity is found to be related with 
lower IPO underpricing and higher long-term post-IPO performance. 
The obviously different results also suggest that there is a regional difference on the effect of 
advertising. The difference may be related to the difference in the market structures of the two 
countries, namely, the constitution of the investors and the regulations regarding IPOs. The current 
study provides a primary theory based on the mere-exposure effect, which is also the underlying 
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mechanism of advertising, and extends it to a possible integration with the market-based asset theory. 
The theory is compatible in explaining the main effects as well as the regional differences.  
The remainder of this article is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2 walks through the 
background of the research idea and offers an introduction of the related psychology topics. Chapter 
3 states the hypotheses and reviews the related literatures on the effect of advertising on IPO. Chapter 
4 specifies methodology and data. Chapter 5 and 6 discuss the result of advertising effect on IPO short-
term and long-term stock returns respectively. Chapter 7 offers possible implications for theory based 
on the findings as well as the limitations of the present study and the possible enhancement for future 
studies. Chapter 8 provides a final discussion and concludes the article. 
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Section 1. MERE-EXPOSURE EFFECT (MEE) 
In Psychology literature, there is an established phenomenon called the mere-exposure effect 
(MEE), which states that people tend to develop a preference for or attach prestige to things merely 
because they are exposed to them before (Zajonc, 1968). 
MEE has been observed with various objects ranging from meaningful words (Zajonc, 1968) 
and photographs (Zajonc et al., 1974a) to novel Chinese characters (Zajonc, 1968; Saegert & Jellison, 
1970) and even sounds (Stang, 1974), which are supposedly meaningless and indifferent to the 
subjects tested. In addition, this phenomenon is generally robust at different exposure durations from 
several milliseconds to over 10 seconds as well as different exposure frequencies (Bornstein, 1989). 
The extremely short exposure duration makes the stimulus subliminal, or in other words below the 
individual’s threshold for conscious perception. In fact, Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) as well as 
others (Mandler et al., 1987; Bonanno & Stillings, 1986) found that participants preferred the objects 
they were exposed to even though they could not distinguish the old (previously exposed) from the 
new (novel). In the study, they first showed the subjects a series of irregular polygons at 1-ms exposure 
durations where each polygon appeared 5 times in total. Then they presented pairs of exposed and new 
polygons and asked the subjects to select one from every pair which they (a) preferred and (b) felt 
familiar. Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc found that the recognition accuracy was no better than chance level 
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(48%), while the preference of exposed polygons was at 60%. These findings suggest that individuals 
are vulnerable to MEE even though they do not consciously recall the previous encounters. 
There has been an interesting demonstration enhancing the claim from a different perspective. 
In a famous psychology study called “becoming famous overnight”, Jacoby et al. (1989) presented 
participants a list of non-famous names to read through and then asked to make judgments of fame on 
one of three name lists after 24 hours. The results showed that even though the participants were 
explicitly told the names they have seen were non-famous, they were still more likely to judge the 
non-famous names that they have read once as famous than the non-famous names they have never 
seen. 
Findings also suggested that the size of attitude-enhancing effect improves by the number of 
exposure but soon plateaus after a small number of repetitions (Stang & O'Connell, 1974; Crandall et 
al., 1973). On top of it, a number of studies found that the size of the exposure effect even deteriorated 
beyond 10-30 exposures and continued as far as 243 exposures (Kail & Freeman, 1973; Zajonc et al., 
1974b). In a meta-analysis study, Bornstein (1989) summarized that short exposure durations, 
randomized order of presentation and more complex stimuli would enhance the size of the exposure 
effect and alleviate the reversal effect after extensive exposures. Thus, he concluded that boredom is 
a factor that restricts MEE. In other words, the exposure-affect relationship is enhanced when exposure 
occurs in such a way that boredom is well-controlled. 
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Section 2. ADVERTISING AND MEE 
One practical application that masters in utilizing this powerful effect is advertising. 
Advertisers usually aim to create a sense of familiarity and enhance the attitude toward a brand name 
or product by exposing it to the consumers in various media forms, which would then interfere with 
their decision-making processes especially when choosing from multiple brands (Janiszewski, 1993).  
Somewhat like the nonmeaningful ideographs used in the MEE experiments, advertisement 
does not always seem to convey product information. Instead, it often times aims to get as many as 
audiences familiar with the name of a brand or product in an amusing way, as suggested in its literal 
meaning of “informing broadly” in Chinese and Japanese languages.  
Moreover, it is likely that the majority of marketing communications stimuli do not receive 
any active processing from the audiences (Bauer & Greyser, 1968). Nevertheless, this kind of 
utilization of nonboring, repeated exposures to an object (product) has always been one of the common 
approaches that advertisers use to improve consumers’ attitudes toward it. In this sense, advertisement 
is the masterpiece applying Bornstein’s (1989) conclusion that eliminating boredom would enhance 
the size of the exposure effect. Using video broadcast advertisements, Tom et al. (2007) displayed that 
MEE was observed for the exposure group, and that “subliminal exposure resulted in greater object 
preference than did supraliminal or normal exposure.” 
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In fact, businesses worldwide have been spending hundreds of billion US dollar every year to 
advertise their products and brands. According to the World Advertising and Research Center (2019), 
the global advertising spending for 2019 is expected to hit $618 billion, with a 2.5% year-over-year 
rise. The largest believers include Procter & Gamble Co. and Samsung Electronics Co., both of which 
spent staggering $10.1 billion US dollars for the 2018-2019 fiscal year (Brunsman, 2019). 
There was evidence supporting the heavy spending on advertisement in laboratory settings. 
Researchers have shown that participants exposed to banner ads on web pages tend to evaluate the 
target brand more positively than those who are not exposed to the ads at all (Fang et al., 2007). A 
significant positive linear trend between exposure frequency and positive evaluations is also found. 
Consistent to the findings of mere-exposure effect, recognition of the brand was not significantly 
improved as exposure increases. Taking a step forward, Yeu et al. (2013) studied the effectiveness of 
banner ads in the context of online games and found similar results supporting MEE as Fang et al. 
(2007). Also, meta-analysis study found that the attitude toward a brand peaked at around 10 exposures 
(Eisend & Schmidt, 2015), which is almost identical to the results on MEE (Stang & O'Connell, 1974; 
Crandall et al., 1973), confirming that the effect of advertising is heavily established on MEE. 
Taking into the real-world situation, Cobb-Walgren et al. (1995) compared brands with 
different level of advertising spending. They found that higher advertising expense led to substantially 
higher brand equity, which in turn produced greater purchase intentions. The next question is whether 
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the brand equity and purchase intention generate favorable results for the directly targeted metrics as 
well, for example sales.  
Academics usually use advertising elasticity of demand to measure the effect of raising or 
cutting advertising expense on a product market. A successful advertising campaign should have an 
elasticity between 0 and 1, where any value below 0 indicates ineffective while any value greater than 
one implies inefficient and underadvertising. Looking at 128 models from 22 studies, Assmus et al. 
(1984) found an average of 0.221 in short-term elasticity and 0.468 in carryover (measures long-term 
effect using lagged terms), both significant at 1% significance level. Mela et al. (1997) also found that 
in the long run, advertising lowers consumers’ price sensitivity, although the effect was compromised 
by promotion activities over time. 
Advertising also has effects on corporate financials besides sales. Eng and Keh (2007) found 
that higher spending on advertising results in better brand sales and brand profitability, and it improves 
future accounting returns as measured by ROA, with the effects persists as long as four years. Joshi 
and Hanssens (2010) presented that advertising expense had a positive, long-term effect on own firms’ 
market capitalization. Wang et al. (2008) provided evidence supporting that advertising creates 
persistent brand equity, a form of intangible value for a firm. 
Probably more surprisingly, advertising also has effects on the firm’s stock returns. Srinivasan 
et al. (2009) found that advertising had significantly positive effects on stock returns, where abnormal 
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returns were measured against Fama-French four factor model. Lou (2014) demonstrated similar 
results with short-term abnormal stock returns, but he also found that lower long-term returns followed. 
Beyond the effects on consumers and firm financials, these marketing efforts may also have 
spillover effects on other related parties, such as investors (Aaker, 1996), current employees (Aaker, 
1996), and job seekers (Cable, et al., 2000; Cable & Turban, 2001). Collins & Han (2004) even found 
that corporate advertising had a consistent effect on recruitment outcomes as it improves the applicant 
pool quantity and quality. 
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESES AND EXISTING LITERATURE 
Section 1. ADVERTISING AND IPO 
One important underlying assumption of MEE and the application in advertising is that the 
stimuli should be somewhat new to the subject for the size of the effect to be the largest (Ehrenberg, 
2000). In other words, the exposure is most likely to be helpful when a company or product is not 
already well-known to consumers, as otherwise the consumers are more likely to judge it by not only 
familiarity but also other dimensions, such as quality, reputation or personal experience. 
Srinivasan et al. (2009) found that the interaction between advertising support and new 
products has a more profound positive stock return impact than the separate main effects. In other 
words, advertising at the timing of new product or brand launches generates more positive effects on 
stock returns than general-purposed advertisements.  
Taking another perspective, similar as the products it has on the product market, the stock of a 
firm could be seen as a product in the financial market with a brand name as its company name. In a 
product’s life cycle, the first stage is usually defined as development and introduction, which in theory 
should be the most effective target window for advertisement to work. Similarly, there’s also a life 
cycle for a stock, with the very first stage as IPO. Since there are findings supporting the effect of 
advertising on stock returns in general, it makes one wonder would there also be any effect on the 
performance of IPO as well. 
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Although IPO is a heavily discussed topic in the corporate finance literature, studies that bridge 
the marketing and corporate finance field are still limited. Nevertheless, the practitioners might be 
moving a step ahead of the academics. In 2011, a Wall Street Journal article revealed that advertising 
blitz was often seen prior to an IPO in Hong Kong (Steger, 2011). For example, Samsonite 
International SA, the American luggage manufacturer, occupied the billboards near transportation 
facilities for weeks before it raised the size of its IPO by over 50%. Other companies quoted in the 
article includes the top players in their own field, such as AIA Group Ltd., and Prada S.p.A., as well 
as the lesser-known apparel firms from mainland China, all seen advertising around prior to their IPOs 
at Hong Kong. However, opinions were mixed regarding the effectiveness of those advertising 
campaign. Some said that even the institutional investors would be affected, while others pointed out 
that some of those who didn’t spend extra on advertising also recorded impressive first-day surge. 
Thus, systematic study on this topic is needed and could provide a guidance for the firms conducting 
IPO. 
The purpose of the present study is set to explore whether advertising spending has any effect 
on a firm’s IPO. Specifically, this study examines two commonly used measurements of IPO 
performance, IPO underpricing and long-term return. Many marketing and finance literatures studying 
advertising looked at the relatively matured market, such as the United States, while this study 
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scrutinizes both Chinese and US market and attempts to figure out whether there is any regional 
difference. 
Section 2. IPO UNDERPRICING 
IPO underpricing is thought to be one of the puzzles involving IPO that need close 
examinations (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014, p. 820). It is stemmed from the fact that for most major markets, 
there’s a positive average first day return for IPOs in general. The average first day gain for U.S. IPOs 
between 1960 and 2011 was 17%. And there is obvious regional difference for underpricing. The result 
of Hong Kong resembles the U.S.’s with an average initial return of around 15% for 1980-2011, while 
for A shares in mainland China it was 140% during the similar period, one of the highest around the 
world. This phenomenon is called underpricing as the high initial return implies that the IPO offer 
price is lower than the fair value revealed by the price discovery process.  
In a typical IPO, the firm hires underwriters to assist the stock offering. There is usually a lead 
underwriter or co-lead underwriters in especially large ones who primarily manage the deal and 
arrange the rest, called the syndicates. The underwriters work with the company to decide on an initial 
offering price range which gives a fairly reasonable valuation for the firm. The two parties would then 
go on to a road show, explaining the offer price and promote the company to the interested investors. 
Those who are attracted then contacts the underwriters and inform the amount they wish to purchase. 
The underwriters then sum up the demand from investors and adjust the offer price accordingly, where 
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the process is named book building. In general, the higher the demand, the higher the price within the 
initial range would be set.  
According to the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), the market price of an asset should reflect 
all information available on the market (Fama, 1970). Fama initially categorized empirical tests of 
market efficiency into three different forms, weak, semi-strong, and strong. Each form deals with the 
availability of a different level of information availability, but the underlying hypothesis persists.  
For example, the semi-strong-test, which Fama later changed the name to event studies (1991), 
examines the market reaction on public information. Typical results show that on average, stock prices 
adjust to public event announcements within a day. However, the strong-form-test, or more intuitively 
the test for private information, provides mixed results and does not seem to support the idea that 
market price reflects all private information. 
Nevertheless, in the case of IPO, even though the company and the underwriters have access 
to the private information for sure, it’s not easy to come up with a fair value for the firm. Underwriters 
often use techniques such as discounted cash flow (DCF) method or multiples to estimate a reasonable 
valuation, and a range is set to accommodate errors. However, with the absence of price discovery 
process in the open market, it’s possible that the valuation deviates from the equilibrium market price 
under EMH. For example, WeWork was once valued at $47 billion in January 2019, before the 
valuation dropped drastically to $10 - $12 billion when it filed for IPO in September (Franklin & Sen, 
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2019) . Corporate governance issues which were not known by the public being revealed was one of 
the main factors leading to the drop. 
Although there might be debate on the accuracy of those valuation methods, for example 
regarding the calculation of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) in DCF method, they are 
broadly accepted by finance professionals and there are no better alternatives. In fact, DCF 
methodology is even recommended in some accounting standards for assessing the value of intangible 
assets (Singh & Uzma, 2010). Thus, it’s hard to justify that it is the valuation method that the issuers 
use systematically underestimate or overestimate the fair value of the firm. In other words, the pricing 
error stemmed from the valuation methodology should be resulted from idiosyncratic noise, which 
means the average of pricing error across all IPOs should be around zero as the positives and the 
negatives cancel out. Thus, the persistent underpricing indicated by positive average first-day return 
implies that there could be some intention involved.  
One thing that needs to be considered first is that who is benefited by underpricing and who is 
taking the loss. It’s common that underwriter agrees to sell part (best efforts) or all (firm commitment) 
of the offered shares. In the latter case, the underwriter guarantees to sell all the shares to the public at 
the offer price and bears the inventory risk. The underwriter purchases all the shares from the issuer 
at a price lower than the offer price, usually around 7% in the U.S. (Lipman, 2009, p. 2). This 
underwriting discount and other out-of-pocket expenses including fees paid to the underwriter 
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constitute the direct cost of an IPO, and the IPO proceed after the direct cost is subtracted is what the 
issuer receives. When there is underpricing and the share price jumps in the first trading day, the 
investors who are able to purchase the shares from the underwriter gain. On the other hand, the 
company would not receive any cash benefit while the underwriter may benefit by selling the shares 
at prices higher than the offer price. Thus, underpricing is also described as the issuer “leaving money 
on the table” and considered as part of the indirect cost of an IPO. Loughran and Ritter (2002) indicates 
that from year 1990 to 1998, the money left on the table in the U.S. was $27 billion, which was twice 
as large as the fees directly paid to the investment bankers. So why do the issuers allow this to happen? 
One simple view is that the issuers do not have many choices as the IPO market is dominated 
by limited number of underwriters, who may use the underpricing as a privilege to their loyal 
customers. While there are certainly several names always appearing at the top of the league table, the 
IPO underwriting industry is considered to be highly competitive. The view can hardly explain that 
why the underwriters who offer cheaper services and alternatives such as direct listing didn’t become 
popular either (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). Another view involving the underwriters is the underpricing 
equilibrium theory. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argued that the expected underpricing of an IPO is related 
to the investors’ uncertainty on the firm’s value, and investment banks served as a medium to enforce 
the underpricing equilibrium in exchange for maintenance of reputation.  
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Similarly, Rock (1986) suggested that IPO underpricing is a compensation for the uninformed 
investors to overcome the information asymmetry. It’s commonly believed that some investors, 
usually institutional investors, have more information over the others as they can afford the costs of 
digging private information. These more informed investors know the quality of IPOs and only 
participate in the good ones. This results the winner’s curse, where the uninformed investors “win” 
when the demand is low from those who know in advance that the IPO is more likely to perform 
poorly. This adverse selection phenomenon prevents uninformed investors from actively participating 
in IPOs. Thus, underpricing is used as a tool to attract the uninformed investors. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) also argued that underpricing exists in order to alleviate 
information asymmetry. They propose that the issuers are signaling to the investors that they are the 
best among all through underpricing, as they believe the extra cost can be recovered from subsequent 
equity offerings. The inferior firms, however, cannot afford to imitate the behavior because the 
disguise will be revealed as more information becomes available after the firms going public, so that 
they will not be able to recoup the expenses on underpricing.  
Then the next question is -- how does advertising relate to underpricing? Prior researches have 
found that pre-IPO marketing spending helps reduce IPO underpricing (Luo, 2008; Fine et al., 2017; 
Ma et al., 2017). Fine et al. (2017) suggested that the result can be interpreted under the signaling 
theory, and Ma et al. (2017) also proposed that marketing expenditures help to reduce information 
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asymmetries. In other words, advertising spending can be considered as an alternative for underpricing 
in order to compensate the uninformed investors and signal the quality of the company. 
While the signaling theory assumes that the companies which are not one of the best cannot 
afford to mimic the underpricing behavior, it’s not clear whether it’s true or not when advertising 
expense is examined. The infamous Chinese coffeehouse chain Luckin Coffee Inc. is a prime example. 
Founded in late 2017, Luckin Coffee was one of the hottest Chinese start-ups at that time. It entered 
the coffeehouse market with aggressive marketing campaigns. In 2018, Luckin’s sales and marketing 
expenses exceeded its total revenues, while the ratio dropped in 2019, it was still at a level as high as 
38% (Luckin Coffee Inc., 2019). Being one of the quickest firms to reach the unicorn status, Luckin 
completed its IPO in just one and half years and surpassed Starbucks by number of stores in mainland 
China by the end of 2019 (Zhu, 2020). It all seems that Luckin is a top-quality company until it 
admitted that revenue was fabricated in the first three quarters of 2019. Stock price plunged over 85% 
in one day and Luckin was subsequently demanded to delist by NASDAQ. Thus, it can be inferred 
that advertising expenditure is not a signaling tool which is only accessible to the best firms. 
One alternative explanation could be the mere-exposure effect (MEE). Instead of alleviating 
the information asymmetries through signaling, advertisings could aim to influence the customers’ 
fondness on the brand, which would in turn interfere with their investment choices. Further assumption 
can be made that those targeted customers are not familiar with the firm already, making them 
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equivalent to the uninformed investors in the signaling theory. MEE can also be related to the market-
based asset (MBA) theory in the marketing literature, which suggests that marketing endeavors create 
intangible MBA and therefore increase shareholder’s value (Srivastava et al., 1998). Eberhart et al. 
(2004) marked that investors often overlook tangible assets but are relatively quick in reaction to 
change in intangible assets. Like other intangible assets, MBA is hard to value but it may be perceived 
by the investors consciously or unconsciously through exposure to the brand.  
Either way, advertising expenditures can be seen as an alternative of underpricing. In other 
words, if firms spend heavily on advertising, they expect to achieve similar effect as underpricing on 
their IPOs. Thus, the following hypothesis is made and investigated in the current study: 
H1: The higher the pre-IPO advertising expenses, the lower the IPO underpricing in 
equity markets. 
Section 3. LONG-TERM POST-IPO PERFORMANCE 
Long-term post-IPO stock return is also one of the important metrics when IPO performance 
is examined. Despite the bright-looking immediate return on the first trading day, many found that 
IPO underperformed the market in the long-term (Ritter, 1991; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). Ritter & Welch (2002) showed that for a three-year period, IPO firms on average 
underperformed the CRSP value-weighted index by 23.4%, and they underperformed the size and 
book-to-market ratio matched equivalents by 5.1%.  
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There are plentiful studies trying to explain why the IPO underperformance persists (Miller, 
1977; Teoh et al., 1998; Schultz, 2003), while others attemptep to find factors that could predict the 
extent of underperformance (Jain and Kini, 1994; Krigman, 1999). This study does not attempt to join 
the discussion, but it is rather willing to explore and explain specifically the effect of advertising 
expenses on long-term post-IPO performance, should the effect exist. 
The literatures on this matter are scarce and demonstrate mixed results. Fine et al. (2017) 
looked at the post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) but failed to document any 
evidence supporting the explanatory power of pre-IPO marketing expenditures. Chemmanur & Yan 
(2017) extended the time period to two to three years, and they found that firms with higher advertising 
activities had more negative post-IPO long-term BHAR than the lower ones, and the effect was more 
profound in the three-year period. They proposed and supported with evidence that advertising 
expenses negatively affect IPO performance by increasing the heterogeneity in investor beliefs about 
the IPO firm.  
First developed by Miller (1977), heterogeneous expectation theory states that when investors 
have heterogeneous beliefs on an equity’s intrinsic value under short-selling constraints, such as in a 
typical IPO situation, the pessimistic investors are not able or less willing to trade the stock. Thus, the 
stock will be held by more optimistic investors, whose participation will drive the stock price up in 
the immediate trading sessions after the IPO bell. Then, when the information gets more available to 
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all investors due to extensive disclosure requirements for public firms, the heterogeneity will decease 
so that the price will drop from the irrationally high level. The effect of advertising can also be 
integrated into this theory. As advertising improves customers’ preference for the brand name, it’s 
likely to turn those were indifferent to optimistic investors, while the pessimistic ones are less affected 
as they already make their judgement based on other information. Thus, heterogeneity increases, and 
the resulting price reversion is also strengthened. 
One competing explanation is again the market-based assets (MBA) theory. Accumulation of 
intangible MBA through advertising activities raises shareholder value in the long-term, since the 
effect of advertising is long-lasting as suggested in the introduction section. Previous researches have 
also provided evidence supporting that more intangible assets help firms to outperform in the equity 
market (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). Thus, higher advertising expenses should imply a better long-term 
post-IPO stock performance ceteris paribus. 
According to the two theories discussed above, the following two opposing hypotheses can be 
made on the effect of advertising expense over long-term post-IPO performance: 
H2a: The higher the pre-IPO advertising expenses, the lower the post-IPO stock 
returns in the long run, ceteris paribus; 
H2b: The higher the pre-IPO advertising expenses, the higher the post-IPO stock 
returns in the long run, ceteris paribus. 
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Section 4. REGIONAL DIFFERENCE 
Since the current study examines IPOs in both U.S. and Chinese stock markets, it is impossible 
to overlook the difference of the two. One of the most profound difference is the constitution of 
investors. It is estimated that in 2019, the fraction of U.S. equities owned by institutional investors 
was over 62% (Johnston, 2020), while in contrast, the so-called qualified domestic institutional 
investors (QDII) in China hold only 16.17% of the market shares in 2017 (Deng, 2019).  
There is similar difference in the IPO market as well, although it’s usually thought to be the 
professionals’ game. In major US markets, institutional investors make up most of the subscriptions 
for an IPO, and individual investors don’t have access to it at all. However, in Chinese markets IPO is 
open for individual investors through online portals. The initial portion assorted to these portals are 
between 30 to 40% for A-shares, and the ration could be higher depending on subscriptions on the 
online portals. 
It’s commonly reckoned that comparing to institutional investors, retail investors are the less 
informed group due to the lack of information discovery resources (Amihud & Li, 2006). Therefore, 
it’s natural to expect more severe information asymmetries in markets with more individual investors, 
or in this case the Chinese market. There is also evidence suggesting that the participation in trading 
by individual investors worsen the degree of information asymmetry (Chung & Wang, 2016). 
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Other major differences also exist in the regulations regarding IPO process. Compared to the 
U.S. markets, Chinese markets are thought to be highly regulated. Unlike the registration system used 
by Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S., approval system is employed by CRSC in 
China. The Public Offering Review Committee under the CRSC has a large saying in whether an IPO 
can go through and it could take as long as two years for the offering firm to obtain the its approval. 
The approval rate could reach around 90% in the good years such as 2015 and 2016, while it could 
also drop to 60% in 2018 (Zhang, 2020). The IPO market could even be totally suspended like what 
happened in 2013. Following the setup of the Science and Technology Innovation Board (STAR) of 
the SSE, CRSC started to embrace the registration system within STAR in 2019. However, the impact 
of the change is not discussed here as the current study doesn’t look beyond 2017. 
Another major difference between the two countries is the pricing process of the IPOs. While 
IPOs in China share the roadshow procedure as the ones in the U.S., the pricing capability held by the 
issuing parties is limited. Like the underwriters, CRSC also uses the multiplier method in evaluating 
offering price, but it has set the ceiling of the multiplier as 15 to 20 times of the pre-IPO earnings, and 
exceptions can be hardly approved. Thus, it can be considered as that pricing cap is applier for majority 
of IPOs in China. There are also restrictions on the number of shares to be publicly offered and floated 
on the stock exchanges, which constrains the supply of IPO shares. These regulations are found to be 
related with the abnormally high level of IPO underpricing observed in China (Tian, 2011). 
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Then, it is natural to suspect that advertising expenses would have different impact on IPO for 
the two different markets. In general, the expectation is that advertising activities should have more 
profound influence on the uninformed, unsophisticated individual investors, and the effect on 
institutional investors is uncertain (Steger, 2011). 
Therefore, according to the difference in degree of information asymmetry in the two markets, 
two additional hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H3a: Pre-IPO advertising expenses have a more profound effect on IPO underpricing 
in the Chinese market than in the U.S. market; 
H3b: Pre-IPO advertising expenses have a more profound effect on long-term post-IPO 
performance in the Chinese market than in the U.S. market; 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, an initial sample set of IPOs were collected from the 
S&P Capital IQ database. The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database which was extensively 
used in the finance literature was not chosen due to unavailability. The target period of data collected 
was a decade from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2017. It represents an attempt to include different 
range with existing literatures as most of them were looking at the pre-crisis period (Luo 2008; 
Chemmanur and Yan 2017; Fine et al. 2017). The sample set includes IPOs listed on the major US 
exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) as well as the major Chinese exchanges (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)). Following a common practice in relative 
researches, IPOs related to spin-offs, real estate investment trusts, unit offerings, closed-end funds and 
IPOs with net proceeds less than $20 million were double-checked not to be included. IPOs were 
further screened that the firm cannot be delisted within the next calendar year following the IPO in 
order to make sure that it’s possible to calculate long-term stock return. Also, advertising expense data 
has to be available on Capital IQ database for the period ranging from 3 years prior to and 1 year after 
IPO. To adjust for the possible time discrepancy caused by different fiscal year cycles, calendar year 




Section 1. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
4.1.1. Dependent Variable 
a. IPO Underpricing 
IPO underpricing is calculated as follows: 




where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟  is the IPO offering price and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑  is the closing price at the end of the 
first trading day (Luo, 2008). However, in the Chinese market, since gain limits are imposed on IPOs 
as well as on the following trading sessions by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑  for firms being listed in the Chinese markets has to be revised as the closing price of the 
first trading day when the equity doesn’t hit the gain limit. Detailed explanation is offered in Section 
3 of this Chapter. 
 
b. Long-term post-IPO performance 
To measure post-IPO performance in the long-term, one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) is calculated from the first trading day. The method resembles what Fine et al. (2017) used 
in their study and is based on the initial method developed by Barber and Lyon (1997). Another 
standard method of measuring performance is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). However, as 
many argued that CAR might provide biased results in tests of long-term performance (Ritter, 1991; 
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Barber & Lyon, 1997), BHAR is widely accepted as the standard method of measuring long-term 
performance. For the same reason, BHAR is favored over CAR in this study. 
First, the buy-and-hold return for each individual firm i over period t is defined as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 = ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the return of the IPO firm i on trading day t, and T is one year after the IPO date 





where day 0 is the IPO offering date for firm i. This form matches what’s provided as on-year 
equity return by Capital IQ database so that 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 can be directly obtained from the database. 
Then, the abnormal buy-and-hold return (𝐴𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖) is calculated: 
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 = ∏ [1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 captures the market return for the same time period and used as the benchmark return to 
be compared with. When calculating 𝑅𝑚𝑡, the return of CRSP value-weighted market index is used 
for U.S. listed firms, while the return of CSI 300 index is used when China listed firms are examined. 
In other event studies, the benchmark could also be calculated using the pre-event return for the tested 
firm, but the choice is limited when IPO is discussed as no previous return data is available. 
Finally, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for firm i is calculated as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 − 𝐴𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖. 
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That is, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 captures the deviation of return of a single firm from the benchmark market 
return. If there is indeed an abnormal return for the specific stock, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 should be significantly 
positive or negative. 
 
4.1.2. Independent Variables 
a. Advertising spending 
As the disclosure of advertising spending is not mandatory with the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), it usually falls under the selling and administrative expenses (SG&A) 
in the income statement. Especially, when a firm is not yet public, the less stringent disclosure 
requirements provide weaker motivation for it to voluntarily separate out and disclose the advertising 
spending. 
Consequently, many researches in the literature use 𝑆𝐺&𝐴 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 
scaled by total assets as a proxy of marketing spending (Mizik & Jacobson, 2007; Luo, 2008; Fine et 
al., 2017). They argue that it is a better proxy of marketing activities than the raw SG&A expenses. 
However, Dutta et al., (1999) stated that SG&A expenses portrait the firm’s spending on marketing 
activities including research, sales effort, promotions and others. Therefore, even when R&D expenses 
are taken away, the rest still contains many other contents besides advertising. It may be hard to justify 
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that it is advertising that really matters when a main effect is detected. Thus, in this study, advertising 
expenses are used directly even though that means a significantly smaller data pool. 
In line with Chemmanur and Yan’s (2017) approach, pre-IPO advertising intensity is used 





where 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 is the advertising expenses for firm i one year prior to the IPO year, while 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sales for the same firm in the same year. As the name suggests, advertising intensity 
is a standard approach to measure the intensity of advertising (Marcus, 1970), and the scaled nature 
allows for comparison among firms of different sizes and industries. 
 
4.1.3. Control Variables 
a. Firm size 
Firm size has been commonly used in various empirical asset pricing models, such as the 
Fama-French three factor model (Fama & French, 1993) and Carhart four factor model (Carhart, 
1997). It is generally acknowledged that firm size tends to have an explanatory power on long-term 
stock performances. Thus, many studies examining stock performances control for firm size. Here, 




b. Underwriter reputation 
Despite of a competitive IPO underwriting market, the top underwriters have advantages in 
choosing the clients and investors they work with. Carter and Manaster (1990) established that 
prestigious underwriters tend to handle lower risk equity offerings. Many also found that underwriter 
prestige is related with lower IPO underpricing (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Michaely & Shaw, 1994) 
and less severe long-term post-IPO underperformance (Carter et al., 1998).  
This study controls for the underwriter reputation by introducing a prestigious underwriter 
dummy variable. The method differs with the practice of Johnson and Miller (1998) and many others, 
but it resembles their idea of categorizing underwriters into four tiers. IPO league tables compiled by 
Bloomberg were obtained from 2007 to 2017 separately for U.S. and China, and underwriters are 
ranked by underwriting volume, or namely the market share, within each region every year. An 
underwriter qualifies for a prestigious underwriter if it was at the top 25% of that region in the previous 
year. If any of the lead underwriter(s) or the syndicate for an IPO is identified as prestigious 
underwriter for the IPO year, then a value of 1 is given for the dummy variable. 
One exception was made for Chinese IPO offered in 2014. As there was no IPO activity at all 
in 2013, there’s no market share data available in that year. Thus, the 2012 league table was used to 
measure underwriter reputation for Chinese IPOs in 2014, under the assumption that investors will 





A Country dummy was included when all the data is analyzed together to capture the regional 
difference described by hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
 
d. Industry 
9 industry dummy variables were constructed according to the 10 main divisions dictated by 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, n.d.), 
with the base industry being Services when all 9 dummies take the value of 0. 
 
e. Return of asset (ROA) 
This study also controls for ROA when examining hypotheses H2s, as the profitability of the 
firm could have an effect on stock performance. In theory, a more profitable firm should perform better 
in the market than a less profitable one. Many modern asset pricing models also attempt to include 
profitability as a risk factor in predicting stock returns (Fama & French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015).  
Section 2. MISSING DATA 
Missing data was not deleted but manually fixed per various sources in order to maintain a 
sizable data pool. For IPO price, Eastmoney.com (a Chinese financial and stock information website 
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provided by East Money Information Co., Ltd.,) is used for stocks traded on Chinese markets, while 
Crunchbase and web news articles from reputable media such as Forbes and Bloomberg were used 
for NYSE and NASDAQ traded firms. Moreover, closing prices are collected from notable trading 
platforms like eastmoney.com and thinkorswim (provided by TD Ameritrade) in order to calculate 
short and long-term stock returns following IPO. In the case of stock split which would cause all 
historical prices displayed to be adjusted prices, Yahoo! Finance is used to crosscheck and ensure 
that the raw data was reverted back to the true prices directly comparable to IPO price. 
Section 3. GAIN LIMITS ON IPO DAY IN CHINA 
Prior to 2014, there was no limitation on daily return for all IPOs in China. However, starting 
from January 2014, China’s SEC has imposed a gain limit of around 44% on the first trading day for 
IPOs in SSE and SZSE. This special rule was added onto the already established daily return limits of 
around 10% for ordinary A shares in normal trading days, and it was designed to inhibit arbitraging 
behaviors especially in the case of IPO and stabilize the Chinese stock market. Nevertheless, this 
creates a problem in the way of calculating IPO underpricing for the firms going for IPO in China after 
the tipping point. In the dataset collected for this study, 155 out of 161 firms went for IPO in China 
after the regulatory change, and 152 of them recorded a first day return between 43.8% and 45.2%. 
Moreover, the shares of many of these firms continued to hit the 10% gain limit on the following 
trading days. This indicates that the price discovery process was interrupted on the first day of IPO 
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and extended to later trading sessions. In other words, first-day return under this circumstance cannot 
be seen as a genuine measure of IPO underpricing. 
To solve this problem, Zhang et al., (2018) introduced a measure of underpricing which uses 
the return of IPO stock from day one to the first trading day that the gain/loss limit is not hit. The 
reasoning is that when the gain limit is hit, there are still buy orders left unfulfilled in the limit order 
book, which means that the price is lower than the investors’ expectation and that discovery process 
is yet to be fully expressed. For the same reason, loss limit is also taken into consideration as Zhang 
et al. found that there were cases where consecutive loss limit hits followed initial gain limit hits 
immediately after going public. They also find that the gain limits had an unexpected effect of artificial 
inflation in IPO underpricing when market sentiments are high. This could create a fundamental 
difference in the distribution of IPO underpricing between the two groups dividing by year 2014, since 
the change of the rule itself could be a confounding variable in explaining underpricing. However, this 
problem is negligible because only 6 firms in this study went for IPO before 2014 in China and would 
not compromise the integrity of the study. These firms could have been excluded but was kept 
deliberately to maintain the size of the dataset.  
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Section 4. METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of testing the hypothesis on underpricing (H1) and long-term post-IPO 
performance (H2s), regression analyses are employed. The following models are first estimated at 
aggregate level where all data is included: 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖)
+ 𝛽5(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖) … … … … (1) 
1 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖)
+ 𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ) … … … … (2) 
Then the data is tested separately by countries with the country dummy removed in order to 
further detect any regional difference suggested by the hypotheses H3s. 
Section 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 displays the distributions of IPOs by year in Panel A and by SIC code in Panel B, and 
both panels are further separated by IPO location. As shown in Panel A, while the number of IPOs 
generally increases along time, the proportion of Chinese IPOs also monotonically increases except 




Distribution of initial public offerings.  
Panel A: Number of IPOs by year 
IPO Year China U.S. Grand Total 
2008 0 2 2 
2009 0 8 8 
2010 1 28 29 
2011 2 22 24 
2012 3 24 27 
2013 0 36 36 
2014 18 24 42 
2015 22 23 45 
2016 35 19 54 
2017 80 25 105 
Grand Total 161 211 372 
 
Panel B: IPOs by SIC code 
SIC Code China U.S. Grand Total 
0100-0999 1 0 1 
1000-1499 2 0 2 
1500-1999 1 2 3 
2000-3999 123 55 178 
4000-4999 12 6 18 
5000-5199 1 6 7 
5200-5999 6 32 38 
6000-6799 1 30 31 
7000-8999 14 80 94 
Grand Total 161 211 372 
Notes: SIC code 1800-1999 is currently not being used, while there is no IPO within the range of 9000-9999. 
that the majority of Chinese IPOs were in manufacturing industry (SIC code 2000-3999). U.S. IPOs 
demonstrate less clustering but are still relatively concentrated in four divisions. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the data sources and descriptive statistics of the variables. In general, 
the sample reflects a group of firms with diverse advertising expenses, size (log total assets) and 
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profitability (ROA). There are also obvious regional differences in most of the variables. The average 
underpricing is 286.01 % for Chinese IPOs and 24.03% for U.S. IPOs. The direction of the difference 
is consistent with previous studies, although the magnitude seems larger. Mean pre-IPO advertising 
intensity is 1.71% and 4.25% for Chinese and U.S. firms respectively. The average 1-year BHAR, 
however, differs with the literature of post-IPO underperformance. Chinese IPOs recorded a BHAR 
of 174.48% during the 1-year period post-IPO, while it is 24.27% for U.S. IPOs. 
Table 2 
Data sources and descriptive statistics.  
 Data Source China U.S. All 










































Note: For all numbers starting from the third column, the upper line represents mean value and the lower line with 




CHAPTER 5. ADVERTISING AND IPO UNDERPRICING 
The effect of advertising expenses on IPO underpricing (H1) is first examined and the results 
are demonstrated in Table 3. Model 1 is tested at aggregate level as well as separately by country. 5% 
winsorizing based on IPO underpricing was employed before running the regressions in order to 
eliminate the impact of extreme values. The resulting sample sizes are 189 IPOs for U.S. and 144 for 
China, totaling at 333 for the aggregated model. As a result of the winsorizing as well as the initial 
distribution difference, some of the industry dummy variables are not included in the U.S. models. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the three models. Looking at the aggregated columns, the 
model as a whole explains roughly 64% of the variation in underpricing as indicated by the Adjusted 
R2. The hypothesis (H1), however, is not supported at this level since the correlation between 
advertising intensity and underpricing is not significant (ß = -1.716, p = 0.11). Among the control 
variables, the firm size is negatively related with underpricing at significance level of 0.05, consistent 
with Luo (2008). Surprisingly, prestigious underwriter doesn’t appear to have a significantly positive 
effect on IPO underpricing in any of the models. With the dummy variables, the country dummy is 
negatively significant at 0.001 significance level with value 1 standing for U.S. IPOs. Mining, 
manufacturing, and service (included in the intercept) industries also display statistical significance at 




Regression results of tests on underpricing and advertising intensity.  
 
Aggregated U.S. China 
 
beta t-stat beta t-stat beta t-stat 
Intercept 
(Base Industry = Service) 
320.409 13.585 *** 36.7851 5.665 *** 481.073 5.445 *** 
Log of Total Assets 
(at time of IPO) 
-8.175 -2.206 * -3.0320 -3.150 **  -35.963 -2.415 * 
Advertising Intensity 
(T-1) 
-1.716 -1.601 0.4202 1.380 -5.773 -2.023 * 
Prestigious Underwriter 3.526 0.295 5.3189 1.187 11.443 0.502 
Country -240.973 -19.276 *** N/A N/A 
AGF -67.342 -0.742 N/A -64.849 -0.474 
Mining -181.704 -2.798 ** N/A -174.5 -1.722 . 
Construction 51.310 0.965 -11.8841 -0.792 273.423 1.856 . 
Manufacturing -24.354 -1.743 . -6.0807 -1.533 -45.068 -1.083 
TCEGS 37.241 1.454 -4.5117 -0.455 53.088 0.957 
Wholesale 6.472 0.181 -10.3956 -1.135 74.011 0.537 
Retail -1.016 -0.054  -4.3535 -0.900 17.630 0.266 
FIR -5.328 -0.257 -6.2299 -1.196 -67.472 -0.469 
Adjusted R-squared 0.64 0.073 0.089 
F-statistic(p value) 50.38 (<2e-16 ***) 2.647(0.0067) 2.265(0.015) 
n 333 189 144 




As for the country-specific models, the results for the U.S. model generally resemble the 
aggregated one’s while things are a little different for the China model. The Adjusted R2 for the U.S. 
and China models are 0.073 and 0.089, respectively. For Chinese IPOs, advertising intensity has a 
significant main effect on IPO underpricing with p < 0.05. The negative coefficient suggests that firms 
with higher advertising expenses tend to have lower underpricing in their IPOs, supporting the 
hypothesis (H1). The firm size is again significantly and negatively related with underpricing. The 
results on these two variables are consistent with prior researches (Luo, 2008; Fine et al., 2017).  
Except for the difference in statistical significance, the absolute value of coefficient on the 
advertising intensity variable is more than 10 times larger in the China model than in the U.S. model. 
The obviously different results offer evidence supporting hypothesis H3a which states that advertising 
expenses would have a more profound influence on IPO underpricing in China than in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 6. ADVERTISING AND LONG-TERM STOCK 
RETURNS 
Section 1. RESULTS 
Next, the effect of advertising expenses on long-term post-IPO performance (H2a and H2b) is 
inspected and the results are demonstrated in Table 4. Similarly, 5% winsorizing based on 1-year 
BHARs was applied before the tests and the resulting sample sizes are 189 IPOs for U.S. and 145 for 
China, summing up to 334 for the aggregated model. Again, as a result of the winsorizing as well as 
the initial distribution difference, some of the industry dummy variables are not included in the U.S. 
and China models. 
For the aggregated and U.S. models, there is no evidence supporting the effect of advertising 
intensity on 1-year BHARs. The results are consistent with Fine et al. (2017), whose data only 
contained U.S. IPOs. Putting all sample together, having a prestigious underwriter is significantly and 
negatively related with 1-year BHARs (ß = -24.07, p = 0.042). Also, the country dummy variable is 
significantly negative, suggesting a generally higher 1-year BHARs in China than in the U.S. 
As for China, the multivariate results are again different wit the other two models. First of all, 
the positive correlation between advertising intensity and 1-year BHARs is marginally significant (ß 




Regression results of tests on 1-year BHARs and advertising intensity.  
 
Aggregated U.S. China 
 
beta t-stat beta t-stat beta t-stat 
Intercept 
(Base Industry = Service) 
195.6589 8.580 *** 33.6216 1.761 . 404.573 5.413 *** 
Log of Total Assets 
(at time of IPO) 
-4.9655 -1.361 -1.2607 -0.470 -32.079 -2.599 * 
Advertising Intensity 
(T-1) 
0.6931 0.740 0.1122 0.154 3.987 1.673 . 
Prestigious Underwriter 
-24.0739 -2.043 * -6.3633 -0.490 -33.034 -1.690 . 
ROAT 
0.6967 1.446 0.5345 1.608 -2.585 -0.967 
Country 
-119.8524 -9.226 *** N/A N/A 
AGF 
-132.3242 -1.499 N/A -162.635 -1.377 
Construction 
-20.9814 -0.407 -2.7325 -0.067 -3.242 -0.025 
Manufacturing 
-21.1319 -1.555 -4.4230 -0.405 -71.067 -2.066 * 
TCEGS 
-12.7912 -0.504 -15.919 -0.651 -47.165 -0.926 
Wholesale 
22.5349 0.557 31.3829 1.054 -90.183 -0.758 
Retail 
4.7708 0.267 12.5449 0.973 -32.117 -0.567 
FIR 
-12.8152 -0.625 0.5238 0.036 -85.672 -0.689 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 -0.017 0.051 
F-statistic (p-value) 14.99 (0) 0.6939 (0.729) 1.704 (0.0787) 
n 334 189 145 





Also, firm size appears to be negatively related with long-term post-IPO performance (ß = -32.079, p 
= 0.0104). In addition, prestigious underwriter has a similar effect on BHARs as in the aggregated 
model, but this time the significance is marginal (ß = -33.034, p = 0.0934). The Adjusted R2 for the 
China model is 0.05, around the same level as other previous studies (Fine et al., 2017; Chemmanur 
& Yan, 2017). 
Across all three models, profitability (ROA) doesn’t seem to have an effect on long-term post-
IPO stock performance. Most of the industry dummies don’t have significant effect either, expect for 
the service industry for all three models and manufacturing industry for Chinese IPOs. 
Section 2. ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS 
Although it is tempting to conclude that advertising spending has a main effect on long-term 
post-IPO performance in China, the marginal significance seems less convincing than the results in 
other studies. Thus, robustness of the result from the China model needs to be checked. 
First, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is applied to test for heteroskedasticity. The result is that 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.86 (F-stat = 0.56). 
Second, multicollinearity among the variables is tested using the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
Conventionally, VIF value larger than 10 is thought to be an indication of unusually high collinearity 
(Kutner et al., 2005, p. 409). The results show that all VIF values are not greater than 2.3, suggesting 
a globally low level of multicollinearity. 
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Last but not the least, calendar-time portfolio (CTP) is utilized as an alternative method of 
measuring abnormal return. Many have argued that CTP method helps resolve the issue of cross-
sectional dependence and the distribution of resulting estimators better resembles the normal 
distribution, while some point out the pitfalls such as averaging out the abnormal returns (Dutta, 2015). 
In any case, the superiority of two methods is not at debate here, and CTP is only introduced as an 
effort of robustness check. 
The methodology of CTP formation is borrowed from Yamasaki and Yamaguchi (2012). For 
the purpose of investigating the effect of advertising expenses, all IPOs are further divided into two 
groups based on their advertising intensity. Therefore, three CTPs in total are created: Aggregated, 
high advertising intensity, and low advertising intensity group. Then, every firm in each group is 
included in the respective portfolio from the day of its IPO and excluded 12 months after. The 
portfolios are all weighted by the market value of all included firms and rebalanced every time there 
is a change in the composition. The monthly return of the value-weighted calendar-time portfolio 
(CTPR) is calculated and recorded from the first IPO to 12 months after the last IPO for that group. In 
any of the month when there is zero composition in any of the portfolio, the CTPRs for that month are 
excluded before the next step. Then, CTPRs is regressed against the Fama-French 3 factors as follows 
(Fama & French, 1993): 
𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … … (3) 
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where 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the risk-free rate and the other explanatory variables are the normal FF3 factors, which 
is obtained from Kenneth R. French’s official website at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
College. 
Conventionally, whether the intercept term 𝛼𝑖  is the significantly different from 0 is the 
interested question, and the result from the aggregated model is presented first in Table 5. All 
coefficients of the Fama-French 3 factors are positive, which is consistent to the expectation, although 
only the size factor (SMB) appears to be significant at 1% level. The intercept term is also significantly 
positive (α = 0.049, p = 0.006), suggesting that Chinese IPOs have a positive monthly average 
abnormal return for the 1-year period post-IPO. 
However, for the purpose of current study, the difference in 𝛼𝑖 between the two CTPs, namely 
high vs. low advertising intensity CTPs is the target to be examined. The regression results are 
organized in Table 6. For the low advertising intensity group, the coefficient of the intercept term is 
0.103 with a p-value of 0.039; while for the high advertising intensity group, it is 0.159 at p = 0.002. 
Although it seems that the high advertising intensity group has a higher average abnormal return at a 
higher significance level (0.05 vs. 0.01), the difference between the two alphas cannot be confirmed 
with statistical tools such as two-sample t test and Potthoff analysis (Weaver & Wuensch, 2013). Thus, 
hypothesis H2b can only be considered as partially accepted in Chinese markets, which in turn leads 




Regression results from aggregated CTP. 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.049 0.0177 2.78 0.006 ** 
Mkt-RF 0.005 0.0040 1.28 0.203 
SMB 0.023 0.0070 3.33 0.001 ** 
HML 0.009 0.0092 0.92 0.358 
Notes: ***p< 0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; .p<0.1 
Table 6 
High vs. Low advertising intensity CTPs. 
Panel A: Low Advertising Intensity 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.103 0.049 2.11 0.039 * 
Mkt-RF 0.0087 0.011 0.79 0.435 
SMB 0.019 0.018 1.07 0.288 
HML -0.012 0.024 -0.51 0.610 
Panel B: High Advertising Intensity 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.159 0.051 3.15 0.002 ** 
Mkt-RF 0.007 0.011 0.62 0.537 
SMB 0.045 0.012 2.49 0.015 * 
HML 0.009 0.025 0.38 0.708 





CHAPTER 7. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Section 1. IMPLICATION FOR THEORY 
This study enriches current marketing and finance literature by providing more evidence on 
the impact of advertising on both short-term and long-term IPO performances. Building upon previous 
studies (Luo, 2008; Fine et al., 2017), the current research extends the analyses to non-U.S. market as 
well as post-crisis period. This paper contributes to the marketing theory by bringing the underlying 
functioning mechanism of advertising, namely the mere-exposure effect, into the discussion, which 
can also be integrated with the established market-based assets theory. The role of advertising is 
documented in reducing underpricing and promoting long-term performance in less mature market 
with more uninformed investors. This implicates that institutional investors, as always considered to 
be informed and rational, may be truly less vulnerable to the psychological effect of advertising on 
preference in the context of trading. It also has important implications for the managers in 
multinational corporates in composing a synchronized strategy of optimal intensity of advertising and 
location of public offering. 
Section 2. VOLUNTARY REPORTING 
It has to be noticed that the distribution of IPOs in current study likely does not reflect the true 
distribution of all IPOs. Although the sample collected seems to reflect a distributed group in terms of 
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advertising intensity, the clustering in certain industries may be the result of voluntary reporting as the 
disclosure advertising expense is not mandatory by GAAP. It is also possible that the voluntary 
reporting is a form of survivorship bias, where only the firms who believe they have had successful 
advertising campaigns would disclose their advertising expenses separately. The resulted small 
number of samples may also damper the explanatory power of the models as well as the economic 
importance of the results. Although the proxy using the difference between SG&A and R&D expenses 
is generally accepted in marketing researches, how well it approximates the effect of advertising is 
still in doubt. This trade-off is not easy to tackle unless the disclosure of advertising expenses becomes 
mandatory at least at the time of IPO, or new proxy is developed.  
Section 3. IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
Currently most related literatures focus on the amount spent by firms on advertising, and the 
content of advertising seems to be at large. As iterated in the introduction chapter, how the 
advertisement is constructed has an effect on the extent of mere-exposure effect. For example, 
controlling the boredom of the material could improve the size of the exposure effect and lessen the 
reversal effect after extensive exposures (Bornstein, 1989). Thus, future studies are encouraged to 
probe the possible impact of the content of the advertisement on IPO performance. For example, would 
a firm perform better in its IPO if the advertisements are evaluated by the consumers as more 
interesting than others? 
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Additionally, existing literatures didn’t investigate the accumulated effect of advertising. In 
other words, the effect of total amount of money spent on advertising in long-term prior to IPO may 
differ from the lagged effect of short-term advertising spending. However, this direction is extremely 
hard to proceed as it subjects to severer lack of data available and difficulty of cross-sectional analyses.  
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CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
With digital devices becoming more accessible and screens occupying people’s attention, 
advertising in various forms seems to be surrounding and infiltrating people’s life now more than ever. 
This article examines how advertising activities benefit the firm in the context of initial public offering, 
and it pushes the limit beyond U.S markets by including two mainland Chinese stock markets into the 
sample.  
First, evidence is found that pre-IPO advertising significantly reduces underpricing in China 
but not in the U.S. This paper proposes that the result is due to the mere-exposure effect which 
interferes with people’s preference and fondness of a certain brand after being exposed to the 
advertisements. Although it is not attempted in the current study to refute the signaling theory which 
suggests that advertising serves as a substitute of underpricing in alleviating information asymmetry, 
a doubt is established that inferior firms may be able to afford to mimic the behavior of top firms and 
therefore send out “counterfeit” signals to the investors.  
This paper also finds partial evidence that higher advertising leads to better long-term post-
IPO performance in China. The explanation of mere-exposure effect also applies to this result in the 
way that the effect of advertising in improving preference lasts for an extensive period of time. It can 
be further related to the market-based assets theory that the image boosts effect is materialized as MBA 
and raises the firm’s fundamental value. 
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The author realizes that one concern may be raised regarding the definition of long-term post-
IPO performance in this paper. While some studies exclude the offer day when calculating long-term 
returns and conclude a long-term IPO underperformance, this paper intentionally include the first 
trading day and documents a positive average BHARs for all IPOs in the sample. Following the 
formalization of behavioral finance after the publication of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), several irrationalities has been recognized by finance scholars and one of them is overreaction. 
Many also used initial investor overreaction and following reversal as an explanation of the poor long-
term post-IPO returns (Fama, 1998). Relating it to the MBA theory, it is possible that at the time of 
IPO, investors overreact to the MBA generated from advertising activities and later adjust the 
valuation to a fair level. Thus, the net effect of the entire 1-year period should represents the true effect 
of advertising, while excluding the offer day might artificially amplify the negative side of the effect. 
Last but not the least, looking at the first two results together, it is established that the effect of 
advertising on IPO performance in both short-term and long-term is stronger in China than in the U.S. 
This paper attributes this result to the difference of investor constitutions between the two markets and 
conjectures that the uninformed and unsophisticated individual investors are more subject to the 
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